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prevail. Id. The strength of the InternationalShoe ruling is that it
does away with former fictions and makes the only test one of reasonableness according to the pecularities of each case. Such a test
in the light of governmental and economic evolution and judicial
progress fulfills our present needs while allowing for growth.
J. McK.

CiummNAL LAw-SEARCH, SE zuRE AND ARREST WrmoUT WAR-

Js=m.-D illegally imported
narcotics into the United States from Mexico and was waiting at a
San Diego coffee shop for some of her accomplices to join her. Narcotics agents, acting upon information supplied to them by an informer whom they had not previously known, proceeded to the
coffee shop and arrested D without a warrant. At the police station,
one of the agents required D to surrender two rubber contraceptives
containing heroin which had been concealed on her person. D contended that the agents did not have sufficient probable cause to arrest without a warrant; therefore, the narcotics evidence should have
been suppressed because obtained by a search incident to an unlawful arrest. Held, affirming conviction, that narcotics agents, when
relying solely upon an informant previously unknown to them, must
have some reasonable grounds to believe that their informer is reliable, but the corroboration of reliability may take place up to the
actual moment of arrest. The verification not only of the informer's
identity, by contacting local police authorities, but also of his story,
by finding petitioner at the place where he said she would be, was
sufficient to establish this reliability. Rodgers v. United States, 267
F.2d 79 (9th Cir. 1959).
D drove into a garage attached to a liquor store which had a
reputation of being a supplier to dry state liquor haulers and which
was at the time under surveillance by alcohol-tax agents. When D's
car emerged it appeared to be heavily loaded as it proceeded toward
the diy state line. An examination of the car, after it was stopped
by a roadblock, revealed that the overload springs were markedly
compressed, although there was nothing visible through the automobile windows that could account for such compression. Upon
opening the trunk the agents found twenty-six cases of liquor. D insisted that the evidence obtained should be suppressed as incident
to an unlawful search and seizure, in that probable cause did not
exist to justify such action without a warrant. Held, affirming conRANT--PROBABLE CAUSE NECESSARY TO
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viction, that where there was a warranting basis for stopping a vehicle, such information as the agents acquired thereafter, from
proper acts of conversation or observation, was legally entitled to be
taken into account in testing the probable cause which could be regarded as existing as to a subsequent search in which the agents engaged. Smith v. United States, 264 F.2d 469 (8th Cir. 1959).
Although the principal cases had the common characteristic of
apprehension without warrants, in the Rodgers case, supra, arrest
preceded search and seizure, while in the Smith case, supra, arrest
was subsequent to a search and seizure. This ostensible disparity in
the order of events is of no legal significance. The "probable cause"
for search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment, U.S. CONsT.
amend. IV, and the "reasonable grounds" necessary for arrest under
§ 104 (a) of the Narcotics Control Act, INT. BEv. CODE OF 1954 §
7607, are substantial equivalents of the same meaning. Draper v.
United States, 858 U.S. 307 (1959). That there is no appreciable
difference in the degrees of probable cause necessary to act with or
without a warrant is also attested to by the practice of the courts in
testing probable cause for action without a warrant by deciding a
posteriori whether a warrant could have been issued on the basis of
the information possessed by the arresting agents before they acted.
Hamer v. United States, 259 F.2d 274 (9th Cir. 1958). Additional
support is found in cases involving activity without warrants, Draper
v. United States, supra, where definitions of probable cause have
been obtained by referring to cases involving activity with warrants.
Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 485 (1925); Steele v. United
States, 267 U.S. 498 (1925).
Having determined that arrest or search and seizure without a
warrant must be based upon probable cause, United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Weeks v. United States, 282 U.S. 888
(1914), a definition of the term becomes relevant. From Locke v.
United States, 7 Cranch 339 (U.S. 1813) to the present, probable
cause has been interpreted to mean reasonable grounds under the circumstances. It exists where the facts and circumstances within the
officer's knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of
reasonable prudence and caution in the belief that an offense has
been or is being committed. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925). Because many situations which confront officers in the
course of executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, room is
allowed for "... some mistakes on their part. But the mistakes must
be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their
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conclusions of probability." Brinegarv. United States, 388 U.S. 160
(1949). Although there is some dicta to the contrary in Grau v.
United States, 287 U.S. 124 (1932), by the great weight of authority
probable cause does not require evidence sufficient for conviction.
Draper v. United States, supra. Even from its inception the Grau
dicta was saliently criticized, 46 HAIv. L. REv. 1307, and today, at
the most, it serves as mute testimony to the sometime anachronistic
tendencies of judicial decisions. "There is a large difference between the two things to be proved (guilt and probable cause), as
well as between the tribunals which determine them, and therefore
a like difference in the quanta and modes of proof required to establish them." Draperv. United States, supra at 312.
There are three general headings under which most of the cases
involving search and seizure or arrest without a warrant may be
grouped: a. where the officer has sufficient probable cause to act
on the basis of his own observation and knowledge; b. where the
officer has acted solely on information supplied by an informer; c.
where the officer's knowledge is combined with information obtained from an informer. Two of these situations are exemplified by
the principal cases, and a discussion thereof will naturally supply
the essentials for coverage of the third.
Ia the Smith case the officers relied upon their own knowledge
in establishing probable cause for acting without a warrant. In
affirming the existence of that element the court examined such
facts as their systematic surveillance of an establishment with a
reputation for such illegal activity, and their observation of the
heavily depressed rear springs of defendant's automobile, which
observation would not unreasonably lead one to conclude that liquor
was destined for a dry state. Lawson v. United States, 254 F.2d 706
(8th Cir. 1958).
Where an officer has acted solely upon information supplied
by an informant, the results of such activity must still be based upon
probable cause. But probable cause in this instance consists in
establishing the reliability of the informer and corroborating the
information so given. The reliability may be established at the
moment the informer speaks, as where he is well-known to officers,
and the genuineness and sufficiency of the current information may
be determined up to the moment of legal significance, i.e. up to the
moment the defendant's liberty is infringed. United States v. Games,
258 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1958); Gilliam v. United States, 189 F.2d 821
(6th Cir. 1951). Just as evidence insufficient for conviction may be

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1960

3

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 2 [1960], Art. 9
CASE COMMENTS

quite adequate for establishing probable cause, so also may the
corroboration of hearsay evidence supplied by an informer, generally inadmissible at trials, be introduced to show probable cause
in these cases. United States v. Li Fat Tong, 152 F.2d 650 (2d Cir.
1945).
Where an arrest or search and seizure have been prompted by
a combination of the officer's own knowledge and information supplied by an informer, elements of the first two categories must likewise join to produce ample probable cause under the circumstances.
Husty v. United States, 282 U. S. 694 (1931); United States v.
Kanso, 252 F.2d 220 (2d Cir. 1958). Personal observation by officers will validate an arrest made after an investigation, when the
investigation is initiated as a result of a "tip", only if the conclusions
drawn from that observation are reasonable and then only if the
"tip " has been established as reliable. Johnson v. United States, 838
U. S. 10 (1948).
From what has been said to this point it follows a fortiori that
there is no probable cause where an officer acts without any knowledge of the commission of a crime except from an informer whose
reliability has not been determined. Cervantes v. United States, 263
F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1959). This is so, regardless of how accurate the
information proved to be in the subsequent search and seizure.
Contee v. United States, 215 F.2d 324 (D.C. Cir. 1954); United
States v. Castle, 138 F.Supp. 436 (D.D.C. 1955). In the Rodgers
case it is suggested that information obtained under duress or prolonged confinement would be inadmissible as establishing the reliability of an informer, just as it would be inadmissible as a confession
of guilt by the defendant. But the criteria for testing duress or
prolonged confinement appear to be contained in Upshaw v. United
States, 835 U. S. 410 (1948) and McNabb v. United States, 818
U. S. 832 (1948).
The principal cases merit attention because they highlight the
law as to probable cause for arrest or search and seizure without a
warrant. The Rodgers case brings an additional factor into perspective-the role of the informer. That case follows the effect
of Draperv. United States, supra, in adding prestige to the informer's role by recognizing his word as a basis of probable cause, subject
to confirmation by the arresting officer.
Reasonable ground "... . is the litmus paper for testing validity
(of activity) without a warrant." United States v. Walker, 246 F.2d
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519, 527 (7th Cir. 1957). The dignity and sanctity of the individual
are not to be jeopardized by the whim or zeal of policemen. The
constitutional insulation of prior judicial determination of probable
cause is suspended only under classes of exigencies which have
received judicial approval on review and which now form a discernible pattern of instances. In these situations the law is adjusted
and imposes on the law enforcement agent a standard of discrimination. Those who fear that the increased latitude given to officers
of the law will evolve into pure license may take heart from the fact
that most of the cases in this area are cast in a mold of judicial
caution, the primary aim of which is the preservation of individual
liberty during attempts to meet the imperatives of contemporary
law enforcement problems.
E. P. K.
CoNTRAcrAL LiABnrr OF GOVERNIMNT FOR AN Acr EN'MAciNG COST OF PRFoRMANcE-EL MENT OF KNOWEDGE.-P contracted

with a government agency for certain construction work. Subsequently, D, the government, awarded an atomic energy project in
the same area. Wages on the atomic project were in excess of those
paid by P and in order to maintain his labor force, P was forced to
raise his wage level. P contended it was entitled to recover increased
costs because of a breach by D of an implied condition that neither
party would hinder the other in the discharge of any obligations
created by contract. Held, D's motion for summary judgment denied and case referred to trial conmmission. If D knew at the time
it contracted with P that it was going to do something which would
require P to pay a wage that was higher than that existing in the
community where the work was to be done and P was ignorant of
the fact, good faith required D to inform P thereof. Bateson-Stolte,
Inc. v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 454 (Ct.Cl. 1959).
It is an implied condition of every contract that neither party
will hinder the other in his discharge of obligations imposed upon
him, nor increase his cost of performance. Beuttas v. United States,
324 U.S. 768 (1945).
"Applicability of this principle in a given case depends not
only on the nature of the act which is alleged to have increased
the cost of performance but also upon the intention of the parties with respect to such an act, either expressed or implie in
the contract." Sunswick Corp. v. United States, 109 St.Cl. 772,
75 F.Supp. 221 (1948).
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